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Abstract  
To unlock the full potential of ICT-related public 
sector innovation and digital transformation, gov-
ernments must embrace collaborative working 
structures and leadership, is commonly argued. 
However, little is known about the dynamics of 
such collaborations in contexts of hierarchy, silo 
cultures, and procedural accountability. A widely 
voiced but empirically insufficiently substantiated 
claim is that bringing cross-cutting digital endeav-
ours forward requires more lateral, network-based 
approaches to governance beyond traditional We-
berian ideals. We test this claim by shedding light 
on three distinct challenges (complexity, risk, and 
power imbalance) encountered when implementing 
the specific collaborative case of the German 
Online Access Act (OAA) and by examining how 
they have been addressed in institutional design 
and leadership. Our analysis, which combines desk 
research and semi-structured expert interviews, re-
veals that flexible, horizontal approaches are on the 
rise. Taking a closer look, however, vertical coor-
dination continues to serve as complementary 
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 Zusammenfassung 
Digitale Transformation: Von Hierarchie zu 
netzwerkbasierter Zusammenarbeit? Das Online-
zugangsgesetz in Deutschland 
Dass Regierungen kooperative Arbeitsstrukturen 
und Führungsformen annehmen müssten, ist eine 
gängige Forderung, um das Potenzial von IKT-
bezogener Innovation und digitaler Transformation 
im öffentlichen Sektor auszuschöpfen. Bislang ist 
jedoch wenig über die Dynamik solcher Koopera-
tionen unter Rahmenbedingungen bekannt, die 
durch Hierarchie, Silokulturen und prozedurale 
Verantwortlichkeit charakterisiert sind. Auch em-
pirisch nicht ausreichend untermauert ist die weit 
verbreitete Behauptung, die Förderung bereichs-
übergreifender, digitaler Bestrebungen erfordere 
laterale, netzwerkbasierte Governance-Ansätze, die 
über die traditionellen Weber’schen Ideale hinaus-
gehen. Wir prüfen diese Annahme, indem wir drei 
spezifische Herausforderungen (Komplexität, Risi-
kowahrnehmung und Machtasymmetrien), die bei 
der Umsetzung des deutschen Onlinezugangsgesetz 
(OZG) aufgetreten sind, näher beleuchten, und un-
tersuchen, wie diesen mit Maßnahmen des institu-
tionellen Designs und Leadership begegnet wurde. 
Unsere Analyse kombiniert Literaturrecherchen 
mit semi-strukturierten Experteninterviews und 
zeigt, dass flexible, horizontale Ansätze an Rele-
vanz gewinnen. Gleichzeitig wird jedoch deutlich, 
dass vertikale Koordination weiterhin als komple-




menarbeit, Onlinezugangsgesetz, Führung, institu-
tionelles Design 
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1 Introduction 
Digitalisation offers great possibility to improve governmental service delivery by bet-
ter linking and integrating it towards a need-based holism (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow 
& Tinkler, 2006), however, information and communication technologies (ICT) are not 
yet being used to their full potential (Weber, 2018). This has been frequently attributed 
to inadequate coordination, fragmentation, and ‘siloization’ in bureaucracy (Hustedt & 
Trein, 2020). Collaboration has been widely viewed as a promising means to effective-
ly address these deficiencies because single organisations can no longer implement 
new solutions on their own given the speed and scope of digitalisation processes (Ferro 
& Sorrentino, 2010; Ku, Gil-Garcia, & Zhang, 2016). Bringing together diverse actors 
is said to leverage innovation and in turn may accelerate digital transformation by in-
creasing cognitive variety (Bommert, 2010), adding potential for collective learning 
and development (Ansell & Gash, 2007), and enhancing technical capacity through the 
development of similar standards of operation (Chen & Lee, 2018). 
The Online Access Act (Onlinezugangsgesetz, hereinafter OAA) has frequently 
been described as an essential turning point for government digitalisation in Germany, 
or even as the “largest collaboration effort of German government over the past 20 
years” (Punz, 2020). Initiated by the federal government in response to the EU Single 
Digital Gateway Regulation (SDG) (European Union, 2018), the OAA was approved in 
August 2017 by both the German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat. The act not 
only obliges the federal, state, and local governments to provide all their public ser-
vices online (digital first) but also to interlink these services within a joint gateway 
(Portalverbund) by 2022. The act also requires states providing certain services to 
comply with IT components and standards set by the federal government. In return, the 
states receive additional funding for the necessary investments at state and local gov-
ernment levels. Because this constitutes a major intervention in the federal system, the 
OAA was accompanied with the constitutional reform of Art. 91c GG (Basic Law, en-
acted July 2017), which establishes the implementation of OAA as a joint federal and 
state task (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe) (Martini & Wiesner, 2019).  
Consequently, the implementation has called for intensive vertical and horizontal 
collaborative efforts spanning all government levels. This approach is notably ambi-
tious and unique in light of the strongly legalistic, federalist German public administra-
tion, which has been characterised by a tradition of “negative coordination”, the “joint-
decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988), and strong commitment to departmental autonomy 
(Ressortprinzip) (Hustedt & Trein, 2020; NKR, 2018). These institutional factors have 
resulted in a system aimed at avoiding disturbances and reducing complexity (Scharpf, 
1993), while having restricted the German government´s ability to innovate and reform 
(Hammerschmid & Oprisor, 2016). This has led to a fairly high level of dissatisfaction 
with the progress of German digitalisation and innovation in public service, the general 
sluggishness of which is also reflected in Germany's position in international rankings 
(e.g. DESI; European Commission, 2020). In view of these structural conditions, the 
cross-cutting nature of the OAA has ascribed great potential for the sustainable trans-
formation of existing coordination mechanisms, as it may require reidentifying vertical 
and horizontal interdependencies and reorganising workflows in and between different 
public entities to provide a consistent (‘joined-up’), across the board digital approach. 
It thus necessitates actors to transcend their ‘silos’ and to form partnerships within and 
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across organisations (Heuermann, Jürgens, Adelskamp, & Krins, 2018; Luna-Reyes, 
Gil-Garcia, & Cruz, 2007). However, the very concept of network-based collaboration 
collides with some cardinal administrative doctrines and traditional bureaucratic coor-
dination (Scharpf, 1993; 2000), which makes the OAA’s implementation a particularly 
complex and challenging endeavour and, for this research purpose, justifies framing it 
as an extreme case with the potential to deviate from usual practices (Yin, 2014). In 
this context, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: 
How can such a multi-level, network-based collaboration be established in a feder-
al system characterised by strong coordination requirements? What are the associated 
challenges and what measures can be taken to effectively address them? Can we ob-
serve a shift towards more lateral, network-based approaches, or does the OAA’s im-
plementation process facilitate more traditional patterns of control? 
While recent research has mainly focused on the technical feasibility of the policies 
designed, less is known about the dynamics involved in developing and implementing 
new digital policies. As it stands, complex public networks such as those required by the 
OAA challenge traditional patterns of control, especially when multiple organisations are 
responsible for successful service delivery. Assigning responsibility, as well as measur-
ing and rewarding good performance, are inherently more difficult in network-based 
structures than in hierarchical principal-agent structures (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014). 
Scholars widely agree that for the successful implementation of cross-boundary projects, 
the public sector has to move beyond traditional principal-agent structures and instead 
employ more facilitative and flexible institutional responses. This usually requires new 
ways of working based on consultation, experimentation, and the strengthening of trans-
parency (Crosby, 't Hart, & Torfing, 2017; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). In contrast to the 
overtly positive assessment of collaboration as a driver and source of innovation 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2019), more traditional public administration and 
policy theory puts forward a more sceptical picture of collaboration, noting the predomi-
nance of phenomena such as negative coordination or ‘siloization’ in bureaucracy 
(Mayntz & Scharpf, 1975). Some studies also give reason to believe that ICT-related pro-
jects tend to exacerbate ubiquitous government coordination problems and thus serve to 
strengthen existing organisational patterns of command and control (Cordella & Tempini, 
2015; Fountain, 2001). This has led some to question the panacea of collaboration and re-
iterate the importance of authoritative intervention when managing public networks 
(Hartley, Sørensen, & Torfing, 2013; Wegrich, 2018). However, solid empirics on prov-
en formal (i. e. structures, procedures, rules) and interpersonal approaches for steering 
and coordinating ICT-related networks remain scarce. Indeed, while studies on leadership 
for collaboration are manifold, the scope and impact of leadership in digital environments 
have been highlighted as a current gap in public administration literature (Roman, Van 
Wart, Wang, Liu, Kim, & McCarthy, 2018). In addition, research has pointed to the need 
to better understand the nature and design of digital services at the process level (Mergel, 
Edelmann, & Haug, 2019). 
In this paper, we take up this controversial debate and address this void. We argue 
that collaboration can be an effective strategy to make a significant contribution to 
digital transformation, assuming that the appropriate formal and interpersonal public 
management interventions are taken.  
To demonstrate this, we draw on the OAA as an in-depth single case study with 
analysis based on extensive desk research and six semi-structured expert interviews. 
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Our analysis particularly takes into consideration the collaborative arrangement driving 
the OAA’s programme implementation, which is primarily led by the Ministry of Inte-
rior, Building and Community (BMI) and the Federal IT Cooperation (FITKO), a joint 
federal and state government IT agency, and the operative arm of the IT Planning 
Council (IT-PC). The IT-PC is based on a state treaty on IT and, since its establishment 
in 2010, has acted as the central body responsible for national IT collaboration. The 
members of the IT-PC consist of the federal government Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) and one politically appointed representative from each state. Most states have 
appointed the state secretary1 responsible for IT as their IT-PC representative. The 
chair annually rotates between federal and state governments, with the states being rep-
resented in alphabetical order. In addition, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protec-
tion and Freedom of Information and three representatives of local government sent by 
the local authorities’ national associations may attend the council meetings in an advi-
sory capacity. 
Our findings shed light on certain challenges that have arisen throughout the pro-
cess, and on if and how institutional design and leadership, two impactful components 
of what Jacob Torfing (2019) calls the ‘public management toolbox’, have exerted a 
positive influence on the event of implementation. 
We, therefore, make three overarching contributions to the literature. First, our 
work provides key insights on the complex governance mechanisms of a highly rele-
vant, yet largely unexplored case, which, although situated in the German context, can 
be considered pertinent to all EU member states. Second, it explores the interlinkages 
of a major digital reform and the concept of collaboration. Finally, it puts into perspec-
tive the debate about how to shape institutional arenas and how the relevant stakehold-
ers can be motivated to actively engage, share knowledge, and provide procedures for 
which decision-makers can be held accountable (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Torfing, 2019).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We first introduce our concep-
tual framework and then outline our approach to data collection and analysis. After 
presenting our empirical results, we conclude with a discussion and recommendations 
for future research avenues in this field. 
2 Theoretical framework 
Several scholars cite factors considered relevant for digital project implementation that 
directly mirror collaborative governance frameworks (Chen & Lee, 2018; Elnaghi, Al-
shawi, Kamal, & Weerakkody, 2019). Against this backdrop, we derive our conceptual 
framework and expectations from models of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 
2007; Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Torfing, 2019) and embed it in the particu-
lar case of the OAA. Within this scope, this paper studies complexity, risk, and power 
imbalance as three core challenges of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007; 
Crosby & Bryson, 2010; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014; Osborne & Brown, 2011), and ar-
gues that successful implementation of cross-cutting efforts depends on whether and 
how the three challenges are addressed through institutional design and leadership (Lu-
na-Reyes & Gil-Garcia, 2011; Torfing, 2019). Since we are also interested in the ‘in-
terplay’ between different public actors, we complement these approaches by focusing 
on an intragovernmental perspective (Figure 1, see also Breaugh, Hammerschmid, 
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Rackwitz, & Palaric, 2020; Rackwitz, Hammerschmid, Breaugh, & Palaric, 2020). The 
following section introduces each variable of interest. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework to understand intergovernmental collaboration  
 
Source: own elaboration based on Ansell & Gash, 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2011; Torfing, 
2019. 
Collaborative challenges and dynamics  
Collaboration in our framework is understood as an iterative process in which (1) col-
laboration challenges and dynamics and (2) public management interventions have a 
reciprocal effect. Complexity, risk, and power imbalance are intertwined dynamics pre-
sent in every collaboration effort.  
Complexity reflects the dynamics of the system’s components and their relation-
ships (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014). It ultimately does not rise with the amount, but rather 
with the diversity of actors involved in a project, as this is a factor closely related to a 
higher level of uncertainty associated with the network (Gil-Garcia, Guler, Pardo, & 
Burke, 2019). The more heterogeneous the collaboration, the larger the amount of ne-
gotiation, and the more difficult it is to anticipate participant behaviour and outcomes 
(Chen & Lee, 2018). The reasons why complexity increases in collaborative arrange-
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ments are various but can often be traced to competing or misaligned frames of refer-
ences (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Klijn & Koppen-
jan, 2014). Complexity within the context of digital projects includes unique problems 
and repercussions for specific agencies and ministries which may have their own legal 
frameworks which are at odds with top-down, government-wide ICT initiatives, as well 
as the complexity of the technology itself (Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia, & Cruz, 2007) and 
its capacity to be adopted (Liu & Zheng, 2018; Mergel, Gong, & Bertot, 2018). 
The second dynamic in the model is risk. Engaging in collaborative networks poses 
substantial risks for public actors who, faced with limited control over the outcomes of 
collaborative arrangements, may seek to “protect the turf” of their organisation (Hinter-
leitner, Tomenendal, & Bressem, 2015; Hood, 2002). These risks are multi-faceted and 
may hinder the process of collaboration, since they lead to a higher degree of uncer-
tainty, and thus may result in even greater risk-aversion especially in public organisa-
tions with little risk tolerance. For example, involving different people not only means 
raising complexity but enhancing the risk that more actors can exploit the innovative 
process to their advantage (Hartley, Sørensen, & Torfing 2013), often favouring those 
with greater power per se. The potential for risk dispersion among a group of actors, on 
the other hand, may spur the collaboration’s initiation and prospect (Emerson, Nabatchi, 
& Balogh, 2011). While this appears to be characteristic of collaborative settings in 
general, some have noted that the stakes could be even higher within the context of 
ICT development because of the mix of high initial financial investments, bureaucratic 
and legal rules of accountability, and high rates of failure (Mergel, 2016; Neumann, 
Matt, Hitz-Gamper, Schmidthuber, & Stürmer, 2019).  
The last dynamic refers to the concept of power imbalances. Power is always a crit-
ical factor in complex, cross-sectional efforts, since moving to ‘joined-up’, integrated 
solutions ultimately requires the affected agencies/departments to give up certain estab-
lished power relationships (Elnaghi, Alshawi, Kamal, & Weerakkody, 2019). Power 
imbalances can result from unequally distributed capacity, infrastructure, (IT) knowl-
edge, skills, and expertise, and fluctuate with the actors’ goals, resources, positions, 
and opportunities (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Choi & Robertson, 2013). This aspect is 
closely interrelated with risk perception because the weaker might expect a power gain 
throughout the process of joining forces, while the stronger fears a power loss due to 
distribution. Power imbalances, however, may not be an issue when working with part-
ners that complement the organisations’ own skills and knowledge, especially in the 
early stages of an ICT-related collaboration project (Picazo-Vela, Gutiérrez-Martínez, 
Duhamel, Luna, & Luna-Reyes, 2018). 
Despite the consensus that complexity, risk, and power imbalances play a pivotal 
role in collaboration dynamics, the right types of institutional design, coupled with ad-
equate leadership skills have been shown to reduce their detrimental impact. This will 
be examined in the following section. 
Institutional design 
Institutional design reflects established sets of formal and informal rules that structure 
interactions and seek to align them to the project’s purpose (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014), 
a role which is critical for establishing project legitimacy (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Hav-
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ing ground rules and process legitimacy may help to relieve scepticism and thus risk 
perception related to equity or power imbalances especially for collaborative projects 
associated with high degrees of uncertainties (Chen & Lee, 2018; Gil-Garcia, Guler, 
Pardo, & Burke, 2019). With regards to institutional design, we make the distinction 
between two ‘archetypes’, those being either hierarchical (e.g. bureaucracy, rules, and 
regulations) or network-based (fora for consultation, joint bodies, and transparency) 
approaches (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Torfing, 2019). In implementation practice, howev-
er, we expect to observe a hybridisation, especially concerning different project stages, 
project sizes, and subsequent structures. For instance, top-down, rules-based approach-
es can be useful to establish trust early on, but once this trust is established, hierar-
chical structure can transition to more bottom-up approaches (Eriksson, Andersson, 
Hellström, Gadolin, & Lifvergren, 2020). Closely related, centralised distributed mod-
els involving a ‘core agency’ may induce power inequalities, but often have been found 
to be the best way to tackle large scale collaborative efforts that span many realms of 
responsibilities, as they may reduce costs and complexity due to better direction and 
goal alignment. By contrast, more equally distributed modes introduce cost-sharing 
benefits and encourage the pooling of ideas (Kwon, Pardo, & Burke, 2006). These con-
siderations provide the basis for our first expectation. 
Expectation 1: Institutional designs that blend both hierarchy and network structures are best 
suited to handle the complexity, risk, and power dynamics of digital projects. Moreover, struc-
tures that specifically utilise a lead organisation, yet remain participatory, tend to be able to man-
age these dynamics more effectively. 
Leadership 
Scholars have noted that the complexity of collaborative approaches, especially in digi-
tal environments may be more suitable to holistic rather than traditional leadership ap-
proaches (Mergel, Edelmann, & Haug, 2019; Roman, Van Wart, Wang, Liu, Kim, & 
McCarthy, 2018). Collaborative leadership emphasises the importance of promoting 
and enticing active participation and group dynamics (Lasker & Weiss, 2003) by focus-
ing on empowering, building trust, and encouraging ‘out-of-the-box thinking’ (Ansell 
& Gash, 2007; Hartley, Sørensen, & Torfing, 2013). 
However, despite the rather open and fluid structures available for potential collab-
orations, public organisations still operate in largely hierarchical structures and ac-
countability remains an important aspect of their work. These environments require 
leadership skills that are attuned to these conditions, bringing more traditional, so-
called transactional forms of leadership into play. Transactional leaders are modelled 
as ‘negotiating agents’, enticing followers to comply with rules and regulations to 
achieve their expected results (Ruggieri & Abbate, 2013). They are usually character-
ised as goal-setters, who monitor behaviours and resort to reward and sanctions where 
necessary (Ricard, Klijn, Lewis & Ysa, 2018). When processes are strongly distributed 
horizontally and vertically within and outside the organisation, the complexity of per-
forming tasks increases, which is further triggered by a lack of clear hierarchical con-
trol forms (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2014). This indicates that it is not simply a question of 
either/or with regards to empirical explorations of leadership but collaborative and 
transactional are alternative means of problem-solving. We thus do not expect to find a 
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dichotomy of one leadership type or the other. Rather, we believe leaders to be ‘multi-
faceted’ (Van Wart, 2003) and to employ a ‘contingency approach’ (Ansell & Gash, 
2007), as they adapt their tactics to reflect volatile environments (Fountain, 2001). 
This, we argue, has made hierarchical intervention complementary rather than obsolete, 
which leads to our second expectation. 
Expectation 2: Collaborative and transactional leadership skills are complementary approaches 
which are necessary to address the digital collaboration challenges related to complexity, risk, 
and power struggles. A key feature of this relationship is the leaders’ ability to adapt their tactics 
to the circumstances, especially given the multi-staged nature of digital collaborative projects. 
3 Method and data 
A single case study design has been selected in order to allow for an intensive study of 
specific perceptions and behaviours (Yin, 2014) which can be extrapolated to under-
stand similar instances (Gerring, 2007). The rationale for the case selection was to see 
whether theoretical claims of collaborative governance frameworks can be applied to 
an extreme case which potentially deviates from usual occurrences (Yin, 2014). The 
underlying assumption is that “atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information 
because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 229). By selecting the specific case of the OAA, we also sought to 
pinpoint potential peculiarities that arise in the context of innovative collaborative en-
deavours that pursue the specific aim of accelerating digital government transfor-
mation. The OAA is extreme in the sense that it requires an unprecedented cross-
cutting approach of intergovernmental collaboration within a highly institutionalised 
yet fragmented setting. Additionally, the OAA is a case which involves the federal 
government intervening to an unusually large extent, given the significant degree of au-
tonomy of its member states (see German Vollzugsföderalismus). 
In conducting this single case study, we have chosen extensive document analysis 
and expert interviews as methods of inquiry. Desk research enabled us to begin collect-
ing information on the context of the case and the key categories of the theoretical 
framework. Documents that were assessed included government policy documents, 
websites, as well as a thorough review of the academic literature.  
To complement the document analysis, six semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted. Those interviewed were representatives from the two leading OAA authorities 
(BMI and IT-PC), government representatives from state and local government levels, 
and a consultant strongly involved in the implementation of the OAA. 
The interviews took place from February to April 2020 and were conducted in 
German, mostly at the workplace of the interviewees, and lasting on average one hour. 
All interviews were recorded verbatim and are stored on a secure server of the authors’ 
university. In order to ensure that all relevant variables were covered at least once dur-
ing the interviews, a structured interview guideline comprised of eleven questions was 
used. Due to the complexity of the case, the interview guide was based on open-ended 
questions and refrained from providing narrow definitions and operationalisation. This 
was essential to obtain objectivity, reduce potential cognitive biases, and avoid an 
overload of questions. Questions were clustered into the following three parts: intro-
ductory (e.g. what do you perceive as the most relevant drivers leading to the estab-
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lishment of this collaborative arrangement?), core (e.g. how far did power imbalances 
between the actors constitute a challenge for the collaboration success?), and ‘wrap-up’ 
(e.g. what would you do differently if you could start the collaboration again?). All in-
terview data were analysed and evaluated in a cross-check by two researchers who ap-
plied an overarching, uniform framework derived from the literature. This framework 
included the following categories: contextual information, the primary challenges that 
evolved during the collaboration process, and the kind of public management interven-
tions enacted to cope with these challenges. These categories were not only used to or-
ganise the information according to the theoretical expectations but also to allow for 
newly emerging themes. 
4 Results 
4.1 Challenges 
Although the choice of “just do it” as the motto for the OAA was “very untypical for 
Germany”, it was an effective approach to mobilise both stakeholders and government 
action, according to one interviewee. At the same time, the BMI as the main driver of 
the OAA was aware of the necessity for collaboration. According to the project coordi-
nator, there was a clear need “to approach this enormous task together based on a divi-
sion of labour at all government levels. We need[ed] a comprehensive structure fo-
cused on collaboration” (Klein, 2018). The federal government CIO also pointed to 
strong collaboration between all government levels as vital to a successful implementa-
tion of the OAA (Vitt, 2019). One of the interviewees described how in his “experience 
of 20 years as a federal junkie” he has seen that force does not work. He referred to the 
importance of establishing a consensual approach by “understanding that collaboration 
will achieve more than using a sledgehammer”, which involves an enduring effort “to 
build up the trust” among the various actors and especially among the states.  
Complexity 
Complexity was stated as the crucial challenge to the implementation of the OAA. The 
scope of the OAA is vast, covering the federal government, 16 states, about 11,000 lo-
cal governments, and 575 services, and presents a highly demanding task for the gener-
ally rather fragmented and decentralised system of German public administration. In-
terviewees described the OAA as a “mammoth task” and a “marathon” that would not 
only encompass the entirety of German public administration but also all policy areas 
and the establishment of new digital infrastructure and architecture. One report by the 
National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) argued that the 460 
state and local government services addressed by the OAA would necessitate approxi-
mately 180,000 implementation projects (NKR, 2019a, S. 57). Given the remaining pe-
riod of less than three years, this amounts to approximately 60,000 implementations 
per year.  
The fragmented German landscape was also reflected in the many different state IT 
providers (albeit not all were involved in the OAA architecture) and numerous state 
110 Maike Rackwitz, Thurid Hustedt, Gerhard Hammerschmid  
agencies (FITKO, ITZ Bund, and a newly established e-government agency) which led 
to inadequate implementation capacities (NKR, 2018). The implementation also suf-
fered from insufficient staffing. Attempts to tackle this deficit were again hampered by 
complexity due to the rather lengthy and ineffective recruitment and personnel proce-
dures, which in turn had a negative effect on attracting the involvement of IT experts 
necessary for the project’s success (NKR, 2018). In this regard, a joint capacity devel-
opment program would have been beneficial for reducing complexity, as one inter-
viewee noted. 
While the complexity owed itself to the large number of heterogenous actors and 
services at different government levels, the interviewees also noticed a very high level 
of complexity with regards to the technical infrastructure. Due to the diversity of the al-
ready existing functions, this was viewed less as technical complexity and more as “po-
litical complexity” closely related to imbalanced power positions. Argumentation was 
often dominated by state-specific perspectives, making it “difficult to reach a joint 
commitment.” This was the case regarding the development of the joint portal, which 
some interviewees described as the “biggest conflict field” of the OAA’s implementa-
tion. Whereas the federal government favoured a unified portal, the states pushed for a 
more decentralised solution which allowed them to keep their existing portals.  
In addition, the OAA called for a radical departure from a fairly well-established 
system of negative coordination. The difficulty of achieving horizontal coordination 
within the federal government was visible in the IT-PC (IT Planungsrat), which, to-
gether with the BMI, is formally responsible for coordinating public administration re-
form and digitalisation at the federal government level. According to our interviews, 
the self-interest of individual states and the federal government often dominated, and it 
was still difficult to consider the OAA as a collaborative effort. The principle of con-
sensus practiced in the IT-PC led to “rotten compromises” since certain topics such as 
shared portal or service accounts tended to be “discussed endlessly and mutually 
blocked” in favour of individual states’ self-interests. The NKR also criticised that 
“traditional reflexes and defensive attitudes can be observed frequently” and were con-
siderably “time-consuming and annoying” (NKR, 2019b, S. 10). A lack of clear re-
sponsibilities further added to the complexity. One unforeseen issue was that the OAA, 
unlike other laws, managed responsibility with the principle “everybody supports eve-
rybody, and nobody will do it himself.” However, this approach had the consequence 
that, especially in the early phases, nobody felt responsible, and “everybody always 
pointed to the other.” According to one interviewee, it was thus necessary to first in-
crease identification with the project and clarify interdependencies, i. e. “to bring the 
OAA into their heads. OAA belongs to all of us instead of somebody else.” This multi-
level complexity, compounded with a deeply legalistic tradition and the lack of an ex-
isting general collaboration culture resulted in the project becoming slow and cumber-
some, compared to the early projections for the project.  
Risks  
According to the interviewees, the several existing risks were less prevalent than the 
challenges related to complexity and power. With regard to their digitalisation efforts, 
the interviewees referred in particular to “commitment risks”. The rather hesitant 
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commitment of states to collaborate stemmed from the “risk of sunken investments and 
the fear of having to discontinue already developed solutions or pet projects.” 
There was a high risk of uncertainty associated with the project, primarily in deal-
ing with the issue of “reuse”, or in other words how to ensure that solutions developed 
by one actor could be taken up by other states and local governments. This has had sig-
nificant financial implications and has been further fuelled by the lack of adequate fed-
eral e-government architecture to support the reusability and combinability of solutions 
(NKR, 2019a, p. 57). The initial implementation phase was also characterised by a ra-
ther high scepticism among the states because the OAA had been pushed by the federal 
government and its accelerated legislation had not allowed the states much involve-
ment and preparation. This lack of initial information and transparency increased un-
certainty among the states and with it the perceived risk of losing control over process-
es and outcomes. The prevalent tendency towards risk aversion, however, was under-
stood as an inherent characteristic of German public administration, which was de-
scribed by one interviewee as written in the “DNA of public administration.” Without 
fundamentally changing risk perception, demands for a new “error culture” were there-
fore seen as theoretical rather than practical. 
Power imbalances 
Power imbalance was a key obstacle throughout the OAA’s development, for which 
the interviewees indicated three different, fluctuating causes. The first related to the 
fairly strong position of the BMI as opposed to others in the collaboration, which was a 
result of its leadership role at the federal level, a substantial budget, and broad support 
from consultants. According to the interviewees, this had a significant impact on the 
implementation dynamics and often led to a certain degree of mobilisation towards 
ideas specifically supported by the BMI. However, this rather negative perception 
changed over time, and the BMI was increasingly found to be supportive in times of 
rising pressure. 
A second aspect was the high degree of heterogeneity between the states with re-
gard to size, budgetary strength, digitalisation progress, and operational capacity in the 
form of their existing IT providers. The three largest and most powerful federal states 
of Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Bavaria were particularly less 
inclined to collaborate in the earlier implementation phase (NKR, 2018). Other states 
with less power and resources, which were thus more aware of their dependencies, 
tended to collaborate more. The general dynamic benefited greatly as all the states be-
came more willing to work together and to take the lead in thematic areas.  
Finally, there was a distinct power imbalance at the municipal level regarding rep-
resentation and resources. The OAA only addresses federal and state governments, 
which has sparked considerable debate whether local governments are legally bound to 
implement the OAA. The significantly weaker position of local government is also re-
flected in the structure of the IT-PC, in which they only have an advisory role. This has 
been a distinct obstacle to successful implementation, as the majority of German public 
service provision takes place at the local level. One interviewee argued that, while 
states often have a sense of self-awareness that enables them to act independently, local 
governments tend to appreciate central coordination and support, an approach more in 
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line with the federal rather than state perspective. In addition, unequal resource distri-
butions at the local level meant that large cities had significantly higher personnel and 
financial capacities to steer the OAA’s implementation. 
4.2 Public management interventions: Institutional design and 
leadership, and their effectiveness 
The implementation of the OAA required a critical mixture of formal coordination, and 
pragmatic decision-making (NKR, 2018). However, the interviewees indicated that 
success was dependent on committed individuals practicing appropriate leadership 
styles, while significant efforts aimed at creating the necessary structures for overcom-
ing the challenges during the collaboration.  
“You first always try to find organisational answers, but they do not exist… In my experience, 
the more you work with structures, the more you realise that it does not work. But of course, you 
must have them.” 
 
To address the complexity, the OAA’s diverse tasks were organised and split into 14 
thematic fields to enable manageable packages and an effective division of labour. The 
responsibility for each thematic field was jointly taken up by one federal ministry and 
at least one federal state on a voluntary basis. With the help and integration of other 
states and local governments, they worked to digitalise all public services within the 
designated field and provided the results to all other governments. For the development 
of digital services, the BMI organised a series of “digital labs” (Digitalisierungs-
labore). These digital labs followed the principles of user orientation and interdiscipli-
narity and brought together administration experts, designers, and users to develop ide-
as, prototypes, and implementation concepts. Although these laboratories have created 
a forum in which different federal levels may converse, the most critical areas are not 
yet being adequately considered and addressed, according to one interviewee. For ex-
ample, one of the most relevant issues that needs to be further discussed in an open col-
laborative format is the necessary legal implementation frameworks. Current legisla-
tion has to be partially adapted, otherwise, the existing legal situation may restrict or 
even halt the collaboration and implementation of individual projects, and the innova-
tive ideas originating from the digital laboratories will be ultimately undermined.  
Regarding modifications and operations, there was a fairly strong consensus among 
interviewees that it required determined action utilising a combination of central con-
trol and decentralised implementation. In particular, the logic of the thematic fields was 
aimed at “distributing manageable packages on many shoulders”, while establishing 
structures that could simultaneously bring all parties together and create steering and 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure oversight and avoid duplication. Some of these the-
matic fields were, however, distributed in such a way that no intensive horizontal co-
operation was required. Breaking down longer-term goals into actionable measures and 
determining small wins also helped to alleviate some of the ambiguity and complexity 
by showing incremental progress. Another mechanism employed to deal with the com-
plexity and related conflicts was to postpone certain projects, such as the joint portal 
and some less relevant public services. 
A clear example of risk related to loss of power and, particularly, the threat of 
forced transfer of power from one ministry to another in the modernisation process. In 
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this regard, a “kind of shuttle diplomacy” was crucial to recognise and bring together 
the ‒ often hidden ‒ concerns of relevant actors, sometimes with the help of others 
such as the Federal Chancellery. Understanding these constellations of interests first 
proved time-consuming but was ultimately necessary to develop sustainable solutions. 
According to one interviewee, communication and transparency were essential in order 
to engage those involved with the risk of failure and “enliven the principle of the divi-
sion of labour and rely on others”. 
The risk of failure was further inherent in the open implementation structure of the 
OAA. Instead of being discouraged by this highly uncertain endeavour, the NKR advo-
cated for instilling an explorative and less risk-averse mindset. They encouraged all ac-
tors to avoid both duplication of work and stagnation due to waiting for a perfect plan, 
and instead organise and support collaboration and synergies aiming at high implemen-
tation speed and quality (NKR, 2018). 
The implementation via thematic fields and digital laboratories was documented in 
a continually updated “digitalisation guide” intended to standardise the procedure and 
provide a frame of reference for all participating parties. Further measures included 
providing working materials to all staff involved and learning through cross-project ex-
changes, an approach which assisted in reducing complexity and risk perception by en-
abling joint sense-making, trust-building, and clearer interdependencies. In addition, as 
recognised by one interviewee, “digitalisation only with IT and without topical field 
experts does not work”, and project leaders have worked to invite external expertise to 
the laboratories to enhance cognitive variety and avoid inertia. 
The IT-PC, together with its operational arm, FITKO, and the BMI, aimed to struc-
ture the overall project, ensure its progress, and establish a monitoring and reporting 
system. However, its function as a central and “extremely formal” decision-making 
body also acted as a counterpart to the “new spirit of collaboration” found in the rather 
informal work of the digital laboratories and thematic fields. While the IT-PC was 
originally planned as a rather open and agile entity leaving leeway for those invited to 
join, it eventually developed into an extremely dense administrative system over time. 
This deviation may reflect the rigidity and prevalence of the established institutional 
structures, wherefore the NKR described it as a necessary task of political leadership to 
shape a “positive joint narrative (…) which shows the opportunities coming with in-
creased collaboration” (NKR, 2019b, S. 10). However, the fact that initial implementa-
tion experience evoked these particular formal structures may also show their relevance 
for the maintenance of the OAA’s dynamic system.  
Interestingly enough, power was vertically distributed within the IT-PC, as it was 
less the political and heterogenous official IT-PC than the subordinated Secretary-
General meeting with its highly committed and strong personalities that proved essen-
tial for driving implementation. In this subordinated body, due to the comparatively 
high level of personal continuity and consensual approach, trust could be built, which 
reduced the perceived risk of unexpected strategic turns by the partners to their ad-
vantage. 
In addition, transparency was deemed important for internal as well as external 
communication, both of which proved relevant for reducing the risk of the project’s le-
gitimacy declining within and outside the organisation. Monitoring the implementation 
process, for instance, was based on the principle of including a broad group of multiple 
actors, and interim results were not only documented but also made available online to 
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the general public, a relatively unusual approach for the German public administration. 
Presenting the project’s process in a uniform and transparent manner also helped to 
counteract contested information and reduce complexity. 
Effectiveness was highly dependent on interpersonal tactics. The interviewees 
widely agreed that formal structures were necessary to “make new ideas mainstream”. 
However, given the strong procedural logic, high formalisation, and regulatory density 
of the German public administration, particular leadership skills associated with “vi-
sionaries” or “offenders by conviction” were described as pivotal to its success for such 
a risky, innovative endeavour with high uncertainties. Leaders were described as hav-
ing to fulfil both enabler and trust-building roles in tandem with setting milestones and 
goals to provide direction. According to the interviewees, particularly in cases of ten-
sion and conflict, these competencies must be applied in informal communication net-
works rather than in formal committee structures (Gremienstrukturen).  
“Care about others, provide a feeling of being taken seriously, safeguard interests, and bring ad-
vantage (…). You have to prove this, and then the process speeds up and they come out of their 
shells. With force and political attention, this is also possible but much less sustainable.” 
 
Although force was regarded as detrimental to the process of trust-building and of mit-
igating risk perception, decisive action by single leaders was seen as crucial, in particu-
lar, regarding the inclusiveness of the collaborative arrangement. To avoid stagnation, 
powerful leadership was responsible for careful personnel changes, which involved 
removing individuals blocking major developments, and attracting individuals less en-
trenched in the administrative system.  
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Sparked by high dissatisfaction with the progress of digitalisation and public service 
innovation, and the deteriorating position of Germany in international rankings, the 
OAA triggered an implementation dynamic very different from those observed over the 
last decade. The requirement to digitalise all public services and systematically build 
the necessary digital infrastructure at all government levels within five years represents 
a unique approach not yet attempted by any other European country. Despite their legal 
mandate, the two key coordinating bodies IT-PC and BMI faced substantial challenges 
regarding complexity due to heterogeneity, “commitment risks”, and power imbalanc-
es. Inequalities further resulted from the higher power of those mandated to monitor 
the implementation as well as disparate capacities. It inevitably became clear how col-
laboration challenges in large-scale projects are interrelated, underscoring the im-
portance of cost-benefit considerations when facing barriers to implementation. Trying 
to address one challenge through targeted measures may exacerbate another, and the 
management difficulty ultimately lies in striking a balance. It can be the case, for in-
stance, that risks and power inequalities are reduced by distributing tasks “over several 
[different] shoulders”, which, at the same time adds to institutional complexity and 
vice versa.  
This paper has shed light on how the project has dealt with these issues through the 
use of careful institutional design and leadership. In fact, it revealed parallels between 
digital governance and collaborative public management literature, especially in signal-
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ling the relevance of interpersonal skills over structure in handling ICT implementa-
tion. Yet, our analysis still leaves the question to consider whether these targeted and 
evidently impactful measures have relied on facilitative tactics with a tendency towards 
network-based approaches or on transactional means and/or traditional patterns of con-
trol? 
Providing strong support for expectation 1, our analysis revealed that establishing a 
central coordinating partner while maintaining participatory practices at the working 
level, was an important way of balancing both the need for clear accountability 
measures while also supporting the flexibility of more collaborative forms of project 
management. 
The examined case utilised both horizontal and vertical collaborative management 
approaches, and thus there was no overarching shift towards more lateral types of lead-
ing and organising digital service transformation. Rather, the actors involved in the 
OAA’s implementation appeared to be inclined to use more vertical measures for the 
overall strategy/coordination and horizontal types for operations/implementation, 
whereas horizontal exchange was practiced rather on the working level within or across 
government departments. 
Leadership played an important role in shaping developments. Individuals were de-
scribed as pivotal for collaboration. A slight shift has already been observed towards a 
more collaborative leadership style, while it is still more an exception than the rule, 
which emphasises the importance of communication and the ‘collaborative advantage’ 
vis-á-vis sceptical partners, trust, and enabling rather than directing. However, transac-
tional elements of leadership continue to occur. This can be largely attributed to exist-
ing bureaucratic structures, although transactional leadership measures were also rec-
ognised by interviewees as complementary means to problem-solving when approaches 
of consensus had yielded less optimal outcomes in the short run – an observation which 
constitutes solid evidence for expectation 2. In balancing both collaborative and trans-
actional leadership styles, leaders needed to effectively mimic the hybridity of collabo-
rative structures within government.  
Despite showing clear similarities with expectations found in the collaborative 
governance literature, the case evolved in its unique way. This indicates that the stakes 
in a joint digitalisation project could be even higher than in other collaborative man-
agement settings, due to the comparatively unknown scope and impact, its pressing na-
ture, and the fact that digitalisation affects all areas of government. Moreover, it reiter-
ates the importance of system context as an additional, crucial factor with respect to 
digitalisation projects. Coming from a rather legalistic state, the OAA revealed some 
delegation of authority with a strong and intervening central decision-making body, a 
structure that did not lend itself well to more balanced, distributed modes of collabora-
tion. While this may have helped to cope with the hurdles associated with large-scale, 
complex projects, it also calls into question the actual extent of intergovernmental net-
work-based collaboration in the sense of established collaborative governance frame-
works. However, as the analysis suggests, there can be different rationalities of action 
depending on the project’s phase and maturity, which also links to the iterative nature 
of the collaborative dynamics and to previous literature (e. g. Ansell & Gash, 2007; 
Eriksson, Andersson, Hellström, Gadolin, & Lifvergren, 2020). Accordingly, challeng-
es to collaboration may occur periodically, each requiring certain public management 
interventions at a time. Future studies could pursue this sequential approach to analys-
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ing joint digitalisation efforts more closely and place findings in a comparative context 
to detect potential cross-case patterns, for instance in relation to past government pro-
jects or to a country with a unitary state structure. This would allow for an increased 
generalisability of our findings but goes beyond the intent of this paper. 
Bearing in mind that the OAA is still in early stages of implementation, our analy-
sis has made clear that a central, legitimate coordinator is essential to deal with the 
complexity of multi-level, top-down initiated digital endeavours. In keeping the exist-
ing organisational structure, the coordinator resorted to vertical measures in this case, 
although alternative motives initially existed, such as the proposed open and agile for-
mat of the IT-PC. This does not necessarily signal a step backwards but underscores 
that synergies between steering approaches can be expected, making hierarchy com-
plementary rather than obsolete. The smaller, less formal arenas are suited to test lat-
eral approaches (in this particular case the thematic areas, digital labs, and the Secre-
tary-General meetings). In these contexts, the relevance of trust to achieve the neces-
sary ‘cultural shift’ towards collaborative and digital approaches was repeatedly em-
phasised by interviewees. Building trust and a cycle of trial and error require both time 
and adequate personnel and financial continuity. While this may also be true for less 
extreme settings, an analysis of the OAA reveals a particular case which exposes the 
German government's limits, but also its capability to change. Given the additional re-
sources from a new stimulus package, rising demand for online services due to Covid-
19, and the joint commitment to carefully governed collaboration, the potential for dig-
italisation and its impact on systematic transformation within the German context are 
far from being exhausted. 
Note 
 
1 A civil service function second only to the minister of a state or federal ministry. 
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